Abstract. We propose a methodology to construct verifiable random functions from a class of identity based key encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEM) that we call VRF suitable. Informally, an IB-KEM is VRF suitable if it provides what we call unique decapsulation (i.e. given a ciphertext C produced with respect to an identity ID, all the secret keys corresponding to identity ID , decapsulate to the same value, even if ID = ID ) and it satisfies an additional property that we call pseudorandom decapsulation. In a nutshell, pseudorandom decapsulation means that if one decapsulate a ciphertext C, produced with respect to an identity ID, using the decryption key corresponding to any other identity ID the resulting value looks random to a polynomially bounded observer. Interestingly, we show that most known IB-KEMs already achieve pseudorandom decapsulation. Our construction is of interest both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. Indeed, apart from establishing a connection between two seemingly unrelated primitives, our methodology is direct in the sense that, in contrast to most previous constructions, it avoids the inefficient Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit transformation.
Introduction
Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs for short) were introduced by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan [21] . Informally a VRF is something that behaves like a random function but also allows for efficient verification. More precisely, this means that associated with a secret key sk (the seed), there is a public key pk and a function F such that the following properties are satisfied. First, the function is efficiently computable, given sk , on any input. Second, having only pk and oracle access to the function, the value F pk (x) = y looks random to any polynomially bounded observer who did not query F pk (x) explicitly. Third, a proof π pk (x) that F pk (x) = y is efficiently computable knowing sk and efficiently verifiable knowing only pk .
VRFs turn out to be very useful in a variety of applications essentially because they can be seen as a compact commitment to an exponential number of (pseudo)random bits. To give a few examples, Micali and Reyzin [22] show how to use VRFs to reduce to 3 the number of rounds of resettable zero knowledge proofs in the bare model. Micali and Rivest [23] described a very simple non interactive lottery system used in micropayment schemes, based on VRFs. Jarecki and Shmatikov [17] employed VRFs to build a verifiable transaction escrow scheme that preserves users anonymity while enabling automatic de-escrow. Liskov [18] used VRFs to construct updatable Zero Knowledge databases. In spite of their popularity VRFs are not very well understood objects. In fact, as of today, only four constructions are known, in the standard model [21, 20, 11, 13] . The schemes given in [21, 20] build VRFs in two steps. First they focus on constructing a Verifiable Unpredictable Function (VUF). Informally a VUF is a function that is hard to compute but whose produced outputs do not necessarily look random. Next they show how to convert a VUF into a VRF using the Goldreich-Levin [15] theorem to "extract" random bits. Unfortunately, however, the VRF resulting from this transformation is very inefficient and, furthermore, it looses a quite large factor in its exact security reduction. This is because, the transformation involves several steps, all rather inefficient. First one uses the Goldreich Levin theorem [15] to construct a VRF with very small (i.e. slightly super polynomial in the security parameter) input space and output size 1. Next, one iterates the previous step in order to amplify the output size to (roughly) that of the input. Then, using a tree based construction, one iterates the resulting function in order to get a VRF with unrestricted input size and finally one evaluates the so obtained VRF several times in order to get an output size of the required length.
The constructions given in [11, 13] , on the other hand, are direct, meaning with this that they manage to construct VRF without having to resort to the Goldreich Levin transform. The VRF presented in [11] is based on a "DDHlike" assumption that the author calls sum-free decisional Diffie-Hellman (sf-DDH). This assumption is similar to that one employed by Naor-Reingold [24] to construct PRFs, with the difference that it applies an error correcting code C to the input elements in order to compute the function. The specific properties of the employed encoding allow for producing additional values that can be used as proofs. This construction is more efficient than [21, 20] in the sense that it does not need the expensive Goldreich Levin transform. Still it has some efficiency issues as the size of the produced proofs and keys is linear in the input size. Dodis [11] also adapts this construction to provide a distributed VRF, that is a standard VRF which can be computed in a distributed manner.
The scheme proposed by Dodis and Yampolskiy [13] , on the other hand, is more attractive, at least from a practical point of view, as it provides a simple implementation of VRFs with short (i.e. constant size) proofs and keys. It is interesting to note that, even though the latter construction is far more efficient than previous work, it builds upon a similar approach. Basically, the construction in [13] works in two steps. First they consider a simple VUF (which is basically Boneh Boyen [3] weakly secure signature scheme) that is secure for slightly superpolynomially sized input spaces. Next, rather than resorting to the Godreich Levin [15] hardcore bit theorem to convert it into a VRF, they show how to modify the original VUF in order to make it a VRF, under an appropriate decisional assumption.
From the discussion above, it seems clear that, with the possible exception of [11] , all known constructions of verifiable random functions, follow similar design criteria. First one builds a suitable VUF and then transforms it into a VRF by either using the Goldreich Levin transform, or via some direct, ad hoc, modifications of the original VUF. The main drawback of this approach is that, once a good enough VUF is found, one has to either be able to make it a VRF directly or accept the fact that the VRF obtained from the Goldreich Levin transform is not going to be a practical one. Thus it seems very natural to ask if there are alternative (and potentially more efficient) ways that allow to construct VRFs directly, without needing to resort to the two steps methodology sketched above.
Our Contribution. In this paper we show how to construct VRF from a class of identity based encryption (IBE) schemes [26] that we call VRF suitable. In particular we deal with the related notion of identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEM). Roughly speaking an identity based key encapsulation mechanism is an asymmetric encryption scheme where the public key can be an arbitrary string. Such schemes consists of four algorithms. A Setup algorithm, that generates the system common parameters as well as a master key msk ; a key derivation algorithm that uses the master secret key to generate a private key d sk corresponding to an arbitrary public key string ID (the identity); an encapsulation algorithm that creates a ciphertext and a session key using the public key ID and a decapsulation algorithm that recovers the session key from a ciphertext using the corresponding private key.
Informally an IB-KEM is said to be VRF suitable if the following conditions are met. First, the scheme has to provide unique decapsulation. This means that, given a ciphertext C produced with respect to some arbitrary identity ID, all the secret keys corresponding to any other identity ID decapsulate to the same value (i.e. even if ID = ID). Second the IB-KEM has to provide what we call pseudorandom decapsulation. Very informally, pseudorandom decapsulation means that if C is an encapsulation produced using some identity ID, the "decapsulated" key should look random even if the decapsulation algorithm is executed using the secret key corresponding to any other identity ID * = ID. Having a scheme that achieves pseudorandom decapsulation may seem a strong requirement at first. We argue that it is not, as basically all currently known secure (in the standard model) IBE schemes already provide pseudorandom decapsulation.
Our result is of interest both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. Indeed, apart from establishing a connection between two seemingly unrelated primitives, our method is direct, in the sense that it allows to build a VRF from a VRF suitable IB-KEM without having to resort to the inefficient Goldreich Levin transform. Moreover, the reduction is tight. This means that, once an efficient VRF suitable IB-KEM is available, this leads to an equally efficient VRF, with no additional security loss. Furthermore, our constructions immediately allow for efficient distributed VRFs as long as a distributed version of the underlying encryption scheme is available (which is the case for most schemes used in practice).
As a second contribution of this paper, we investigate on the possibility of implementing VRF suitable IB-KEMs. Toward this goal, we first show how to construct a VRF suitable IB-KEM from the Sakai-Kasahara IB-KEM [25] . Interestingly, the resulting VRF turns out to be very similar to the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF [13] , thus showing that the latter construction can actually be seen as a special case of our general methodology. Next, we propose a new implementation of VRF suitable IB-KEM inspired (but more efficient) by Lysyanskaya's VRF [20] (which in turn builds from the Naor Reingold's PRF [24] ). The proposed scheme can be proved secure under the assumed intractability, in bilinear groups, of the decisional -th weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion problem (decisional -wBDHI * for short) introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [4] . Interestingly, even though the decisional -wBDHI * assumption is asymptotic in nature, the parameter does not need to be too large in order for our security proof to go through. This is because it directly affects only the size of the space of valid identities but not the number of adversarial queries allowed in the security reduction 3 (as opposed to most known proofs using asymptotic assumptions). This means that in practice it is enough to assume the decisional -wBDHI * assumption to hold only for reasonably small values of (such as = 160 or = 256).
IBEs and Digital Signatures. Naor pointed out (see [5] ) that a fully secure identity based encryption scheme can be transformed into a secure signature scheme as follows. One sets the message space as the set I of valid identities of the IBE. To sign m ∈ I one executes the key derivation algorithm on input m, and outputs d sk as the signature. A signature on m is verified by encrypting a random M with respect to the identity m, and then by checking that decrypting the resulting ciphertext one gets back M . Thus if one considers an IBE with unique key derivation (i.e. where for each identity one single corresponding decryption key can be computed) the methodology sketched above leads to a secure unique digital signature scheme (i.e. a digital signature scheme for which each message admits one single valid signature). Since secure unique signatures are, by definition, verifiable unpredictable functions, at first glance our construction might seem to (somewhat) follow from Naor's remark. We argue that this does not seem to be the case for two reasons. First, our construction does not require the underlying IB-KEM to have unique key derivation, but only to provide unique decapsulation. Clearly the former property implies the latter, but there is no reason to exclude the possibility of constructing a scheme realizing unique decapsulation using a randomized key derivation procedure. Second, a crucial requirement for Naor's transformation to work is that the original IBE is actu-ally fully secure. A VRF-suitable IB-KEM, on the other hand, is required to be secure only in a much weaker sense (that we call weak selective ID security).
Other related Work. As pointed out above the notion of VRF is related to the notion of unique signatures. Unique signatures were introduced by Goldwasser and Ostrovsky [16] (they called them invariant signatures). The only known constructions of unique signatures in the plain model (i.e. without common parameters or random oracles) are due to Micali, Rabin and Vadhan [21] , to Lysyanskaya [20] and to Boneh and Boyen [3] . In the common string model, Goldwasser and Ostrovsky [16] also showed that unique signatures require the same kind of assumptions needed to construct non interactive zero knowledge.
Dodis and Puniya in [12] address the problem of constructing Verifiable Random Permutations from Verifiable Random Functions. They define VRPs as the verifiable analogous of pseudorandom permutations. In particular they point out that the technique of Luby-Rackoff [19] (for constructing PRPs from PRFs) cannot be applied in this case. This is due to the fact that VRP proofs must reveal the VRF outputs and proofs of the intermediate rounds. In their paper they show a construction in which a super-logarithmic number of executions of the Feistel transformation suffices to build a VRP.
More recently Chase and Lysyanskaya [8] introduced the notion of simulatable VRF. Informally a simulatable VRF is a VRF with the additional property that proofs can be simulated, meaning with this that a simulator can fake proofs showing that the value of F sk (x) is y for any y of its choice. Simulatable VRFs can be used to provide a direct transformation from single theorem non interactive zero knowledge to multi theorem NIZK and work in the common reference string model.
Preliminaries
Before presenting our results we briefly recall some basic definitions. In what follows we will denote with k a security parameter. The participants to our protocols are modeled as probabilistic Turing machines whose running time is bounded by some polynomial in k. Denote with N the set of natural numbers and with R + the set of positive real numbers. We say that a function : N → R + is negligible if and only if for every polynomial P (k) there exists an
A indicates the process of selecting a at random and uniformly over A (which in particular assumes that A can be sampled efficiently).
Verifiable Random Functions Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs for short) were introduced by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan [21] . Intuitively, a VRF is something that behaves like a pseudorandom function, but also allows for a proof of its output correctness. More formally, a VRF is a triplet of algorithms VRF = (Gen, Func, V) providing the following functionalities. The key generation algorithm Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the security parameter and produces a couple of matching public and private keys (vpk , vsk ). The deterministic algorithm Func, on input the secret key vsk and the input x to the VRF, computes (F vsk (x), Prove vsk (x)), where F vsk (x) is the value of the VRF and Prove vsk (x) its proof of correctness. The verification algorithm V takes as input (vpk , x, v, π) and outputs a bit indicating whether or not π is a valid proof that F vsk (x) = v.
Let a : N → N ∪ { * } and b : N → N be functions computable in polynomial time (in k). Moreover we assume that a(k) and b(k) are bounded by a polynomial in k, except if a takes the value * (in this case we simply assume that the VRF can take inputs of arbitrary length). Formally, we say that VRF = (Gen, Func, V) is a VRF of input length a(k) and output length b(k), if the following conditions are met.
Domain Range Correctness
For all x ∈ {0, 1} a(k) it has to be the case that
. We require this condition to hold with overwhelming probability (over the choices of (vpk , vsk )).
We require this condition to hold with overwhelming probability (over the choices of (vpk , vsk ) and the coin tosses of V).
Uniqueness No values (vpk , x, v 1 , v 2 , π 1 , π 2 ) can satisfy (unless with negligible probability over the coin tosses of
where the notation A Func(·) indicates that A has oracle access to the algorithm Func. In order to make this definition sensible, we impose that A cannot query the oracle on input x.
We also introduce a new notion of VRF that we call selective-VRF. Informally speaking, a selective-VRF is a VRF with a relaxed pseudorandomness property in which the adversary is required to commit ahead of time (i.e. before seeing the public key) to the input value it intends to attack.
More formally we define a selective-VRF as a VRF in which the pseudorandomness property is replaced by the following selective variant.
Selective Pseudorandomness For all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we require that
where the adversary cannot query x to the oracle Func(·).
ID based encryption An identity based encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) providing the following functionality. The trusted authority runs Setup, on input 1 k , to generate a master key pair (mpk , msk ). Without loss of generality we assume that the public key mpk specifies a message space M and a value n (polynomial in the security parameter) indicating the length of each identity. It publishes the master public key mpk and keeps the master secret key msk private. When a user with identity ID wishes to become part of the system, the trusted authority distributor generates a user decryption key d ID $ ← KeyDer(msk , ID), and sends this key over a secure and authenticated channel to the user. To send an encrypted message m to the user with identity ID, the sender computes the ciphertext C $ ← Enc(mpk , ID, m), which can be decrypted by the user as m ← Dec(d ID , C ).
Boneh and Franklin [5] formally defined the notion of security for identity based encryption schemes. In particular they defined chosen plaintext security against adaptive chosen identity attack. Intuitively, such a notion, captures the requirement that security should be preserved even when facing an adversary who is allowed to choose the identity it wishes to attack. Later, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [7] introduced a weaker notion of security in which the adversary is required to commit ahead of time (i.e. before the parameters of the scheme are made public) to the identity it intends to attack. A scheme meeting such a weaker security requirement is said selective ID, chosen plaintext secure IBE (IND-sID-CPA).
Selective identity IBE security is defined as follows: during a preliminary phase the adversary outputs an identity ID * on which it wants to be challenged. Next, we distinguish the following stages:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm, gives to the adversary the public parameters of the system, and keeps the master secret key msk for himself. Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to ask an arbitrary (but polynomially limited) number of key derivation queries. During each of these queries the adversary gives the challenger an identity ID = ID * of its choice and gets back the corresponding private key (the challenger answers such queries by providing to the adversary the output produced by the algorithm KeyDer, when executed on input ID and msk ). The queries may be asked adaptively, meaning with this that each query can depend on previously issued ones. Challenge When Phase 1 is over the adversary outputs two (equal length) messages m 0 and m 1 . The challenger picks a random bit b and sets C ← Enc(mpk , ID * , m b ) as the challenge ciphertext. Finally, it sends C to the adversary. Phase 2 This goes exactly as phase 1. Guess When phase 2 is over, the adversary outputs a bit b denoting its guess for the bit b. The adversary wins if b = b
We define the advantage of an adversary A in attacking the encryption scheme as
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
In this paper we introduce a new notion of security for IBE schemes that we call weak selective ID security. More precisely, we define weak selective ID security as the full fledged selective case with the exception that here the challenge identity is chosen by the challenger and given in input to the adversary. Clearly, this notion is weaker with respect to selective ID security as it is easy to see that the latter implies the former.
Identity Based Key Encapsulation An identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM) scheme allows a sender and a receiver to agree on a random session key K in such a way that the sender can create K from public parameters and receiver identity and the receiver can recover K using his secret key. This notion, in the context of identity-based encryption, was first formalized by Bentahar et al. [1] .
An IB-KEM scheme is defined by four algorithms:
is a probabilistic algorithm that takes in input a security parameter k and outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk .
-KeyDer(msk , ID) The key derivation algorithm uses the master secret key to compute a secret key sk ID for identity ID. -Encap(mpk , ID) The encapsulation algorithm computes a random session key K and a corresponding ciphertext C encrypted under the identity ID. -Decap(C , sk ID ) allows the possessor of a secret key sk ID to decapsulate C to get back a session key K. We denote by K the session key space.
For correctness it is required that ∀k ∈ N, ID ∈ ID, (C , K) $ ← Encap(mpk , ID) the following probability holds for all possible (mpk , msk )
Here we define the notion of weak selective ID security for IB-KEM schemes. Let IBKEM be a IBE scheme with key encapsulation mechanism. Then IBKEM is weakly selective ID secure against adaptively-chosen plaintext attacks The adversary wins if b = b. We formally define the advantage of A against IBKEM in the above game as
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
VRF-suitable IB-KEMs. Our VRF construction relies on a special class of identity based key encapsulation mechanisms that we call VRF suitable. In particular, a VRF suitable IB-KEM is defined by the following algorithms -Setup(1 k ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes in input a security parameter k and outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk .
-KeyDer(msk , ID) The key derivation algorithm uses the master secret key to compute a secret key sk ID for identity ID and some auxiliary information aux ID needed to correctly encapsulate and decapsulate the key. -Encap(mpk , ID, aux ID ) The encapsulation algorithm computes a random session key K, using (mpk , ID, aux ID ). Moreover it uses (mpk , ID) to computes a ciphertext C encrypted under the identity ID. Notice that aux ID is required to compute K but not to compute C . -Decap(C , sk ID , aux ID ) allows the possessor of sk ID and aux ID to decapsulate C to get back a session key K. We denote by K the session key space.
Remark 1.
Notice that the description above differs from the one given for basic IB-KEM in that here we require the encapsulation and decapsulation mechanism to use some auxiliary information aux ID , produced by KeyDer, to work correctly. Clearly if one sets aux ID = ⊥ one goes back to the original description. Thus the new paradigm is slightly more general as it allows to consider encapsulation mechanism where everybody can compute the ciphertext but only those knowing the aux ID information can compute the key. Notice however that aux ID does not allow, by itself, to decapsulate. In some sense, this auxiliary information should be seen as a value that completes the public key (rather than something that completes the secret key) 4 . Even though such a syntax may look totally meaningless in the standard public key scenario, it turns out to be extremely useful (see below) in our context. Moreover, the IB-KEM has to satisfy the following properties:
1. Unique decapsulation. Let ID 0 be any valid identity and C a ciphertext encrypted under ID 0 . We require that no valid identity ID can satisfy (unless with negligible probability)
2. Pseudorandom decapsulation Let C be an encapsulation produced using identity ID 0 , we require the session key to look random even if the decapsulation algorithm is executed using the secret key corresponding to any other ID. More formally, we define the following experiment, for a polynomially bounded adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ).
Experiment Exp
With A KeyDer(·) we denote that an algorithm A has oracle access to the key derivation algorithm. Let ID denote identity space, i.e. the space from which the adversary (and everybody else) is allowed to choose the identities. In the experiment Exp
IB-KEM-RDECAP IBKEM,A
we need the following restrictions: -the identity ID output by A 1 should not be asked before; -A 2 is not allowed to query the oracle on ID. We define the advantage of A in the IB-KEM-RDECAP experiment as
IBKEM has pseudorandom decapsulation if for any polynomially bounded adversary A the advantage Adv
Remark 2. Notice that the definition above essentially rules out all those schemes where the decapsulation algorithm, when invoked with wrong identity keys, returns ⊥ or any other error message. In other words, a necessary condition for an IBE to be VRF suitable is that its decapsulation procedure always outputs some random looking key, even when invoked on "wrong" identities.
Remark 3.
Requiring that an IB-KEM provides pseudorandom decapsulation might seem a very strong requirement at first. We argue that it is not, at least if the known constructions of IB-KEMs are considered. Indeed, all currently known schemes which are IND-CPA secure (but not IND-CCA secure) in the standard model already have this property. In appendix B.1 we prove that the IB-KEM derived from Waters scheme [27] provides pseudorandom decapsulation, while in section 4.1 we prove that the same holds true for the IB-KEM by Sakai and Kasahara [25] . It is easy to generalize such proofs to the case of Boneh Boyen (BB1) [2] and to the case of Boneh Boyen (BB2) [2] and Gentry [14] , respectively.
In this section we show our construction of Verifiable Random Functions from a VRF-suitable IB-KEM IBKEM = (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap). Let ID be the identity space, K the session key space and SK the secret key space. Then we construct VRF = (Gen, Func, V) which models a function from input space ID to output space K.
, chooses an arbitrary identity ID 0 ∈ ID and computes C 0 ← Encap(mpk , ID 0 ). Then it sets vpk = (mpk , C 0 ) and vsk = msk . Func vsk (x) computes π x = (sk x , aux x ) = KeyDer(msk , x) and y = Decap(C 0 , π x ).
It returns (y, π x ) where y is the output of the function and π x is the proof. V(vpk , x, y, π x ) first checks if π x is a valid proof for x in the following way. It computes (C, K) = Encap(mpk , x, aux x ) and checks if K = Decap(C, π x ). Then it checks the validity of y by testing if Decap(C 0 , π x ) = y. If both the tests are true, then the algorithm returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
Security Proof
Now we prove that the proposed construction actually realizes a secure VRF.
Theorem 1.
Assume IBKEM is a VRF Suitable IB-KEM scheme, as described in section 2 then the construction given above is a verifiable random function.
Proof. According to the definition given in section 2, we prove that VRF = (Gen, Func, V) is a verifiable random function by showing that it satisfies all the properties. Domain range correctness and provability trivially follow from the IB-KEM scheme correctness. Since IBKEM has unique decapsulation the uniqueness property is satisfied for construction of VRF. To prove the residual pseudorandomness we assume there exists an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the residual pseudorandomness of VRF with non-negligible probability 1 2 + (k). Then we can build an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) which has non-negligible advantage (k) in the IB-KEM-RDECAP game. B 1 receives in input from its Challenger the public key mpk and a ciphertext C * 0 . It sets vpk = (mpk , C * 0 ) and runs A 1 (vpk ). The adversary A is allowed to make queries to the function oracle Func(·). B simulates this oracle in the following way. Given input x ∈ ID, it queries the key derivation oracle on x. It obtains (sk x , aux x ) and returns (Decap(C * 0 , sk x ), sk x , aux x ) to the adversary. When A 1 outputs an elementx, B 1 gives the same element to its challenger. Thus the challenger produces K * , which is either the decapsulation of C * 0 with (skx, auxx) or a random element of K, and gives it to B 2 . Then B 2 runs b ← A 2 (st, K * ) and outputs b to the Challenger. Since the simulation is perfect, if A outputs b = b with probability Notice that, when describing the notion of VRF suitable IB-KEM, we did not expect the underlying scheme to meet any additional security requirement. With the following theorem we show that, indeed, a necessary condition, in order for an IB-KEM to be VRF suitable, is that it is secure only in a weak selective sense.
Theorem 2. Let IBKEM be a VRF Suitable IB-KEM, then it is also a weakly selective secure IB-KEM (in the sense of the definition given in section 2).
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction that there exists an adversary A that breaks the weak selective security of the given (VRF suitable) IB-KEM, we show how to use this adversary to construct another adversary B that refutes the pseudorandom decapsulation of the scheme. B starts by receiving (mpk , ID 0 , C * ) from his own challenging oracle. Next, B outputs ID = ID 0 to the oracle, and receives back K b (which is either the right decapsulation key corresponding to C * or a random one) and aux ID0 . Now B runs A on input (mpk , C * , K b , ID 0 , aux ID0 ). Whenever A asks for a key derivation query, B uses its own oracle to answer the query, in the obvious way. Finally, when A outputs a bit b , B outputs b . It is easy to see that the advantage of B in breaking the pseudorandom decapsulation is exactly the advantage of A in breaking the weak selective security of the scheme.
VRF suitable IB-KEMs
In this section we describe our constructions of Verifiable Random functions from VRF suitable encryption schemes. In particular, in light of the results presented in section 3, we focus on constructing VRF suitable IB-KEM schemes.
We start by describing, in section 4.1, a VRF from the Sakai-Kasahara [25] IB-KEM. Interestingly, the proposed VRF is basically the same as the VRF proposed by Dodis and Yampolskiy [13] , thus showing that their construction can be seen as a special case of our general paradigm.
Next we present, in section 4.2, a new construction of VRF suitable IB-KEM from an assumption related to the -Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion assumption (see [2] ), that is known as the decisional -weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion assumption (decisional -wBDHI * , following the acronym used in [4] ). The decisional -wBDHI * was introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [4] and it (informally) states that given g b , g c , g
c should remain indistinguishable from random to any polynomially bounded adversary. The assumption is related to the bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion assumption ( -BDHI), in the sense that the former is known to hold in all those groups where the latter holds, but the converse is not known to be true. Interestingly, in order for our construction to work, the parameter does not need to be too large. This is because it only limits to 2 the size of the space of valid identities but it does not affect in any other way the number of adversarial queries allowed in the security proof (as in most known proofs using q-type assumptions). Said in a different way, is required to grow only in a logarithmic way (rather than linearly) with respect to the number of adversarial queries allowed. This means that it is enough to assume that the -wBDHI * assumption holds only for rather small values of (i.e. = 160 or = 256).
As a final note we mention that, in principle, one could construct a VRF from Boneh Franklin's IBE. Indeed, we prove in appendix B.2, that the KEM version of the scheme is actually a VRF suitable IB-KEM, under the decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption. This construction, however, is of very limited interest, since the proof holds in the random oracle model.
Sakai-Kasahara VRF
We briefly recall the KEM version of the Sakai-Kasahara IBE scheme (SK for short) [25] . This scheme relies on the q-decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellmann Inversion assumption (DBDHI for short), introduced by Boneh and Boyen in [2] . Informally, the DBDHI assumption in bilinear group G of prime order p states that, for every PPT algorithm A and for a parameter q, A has negligible probability into distinguishing e(g, g)
1/x ∈ G T from a random one after seeing
). If we suppose that G(1 k ) is a bilinear group generator which takes in input a security parameter k, then (asymptotically) the DBDHI assumption holds for G if A's probability of success is negligible in k, for any q polynomial in k.
to obtain the description of the groups G, G T and of a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . The description of G contains a generator g ∈ G. Then the algorithm picks a random s $ ← Z p and sets h = g s , mpk = (g, h), msk = s.
-KeyDer(msk , ID) We assume ID ∈ Z p . The key derivation algorithm constructs the secret key sk ID = g 1 s+ID . -Encap(mpk , ID) The encapsulation algorithm picks a random t $ ← Z p and computes a random session key K = e(g, g)
t and a corresponding ciphertext C = (g s g ID ) t . -Decap(C , sk ID ) the decapsulation algorithm uses the secret key sk ID to compute a session key K from a ciphertext C as follows: K = e(C , sk ID ).
First notice that, assuming aux ID = ⊥ ∀ID, the above description fits our syntax of VRF suitable IB-KEMs. Now we prove that the Sakai-Kasahara IB-KEM scheme can be used to construct a VRF (i.e. that it actually provides unique decapsulation and pseudorandom decapsulation). In particular, the resulting VRF can only support superpolynomially-sized (in the security parameter) input space. Notice that all known constructions of VRF made the same assumption.
Theorem 3. Assuming that the DBDHI assumption holds in a bilinear group G, then the Sakai-Kasahara IB-KEM [25] is a VRF-suitable IB-KEM.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that the IB-KEM scheme presented above has unique decapsulation and satisfies the pseudorandom decapsulation property.
First, let us focus on the key derivation algorithm. If we fix a specific (mpk , msk ) pair, it is easy to see that we can obtain only one key for each identity (i.e. no random choices are possible). Now we prove that SK satisfies pseudorandom decapsulation under the DB-DHI assumption. Let ID = {ID 0 , · · · , ID q−1 } ⊆ Z p be the sets of all possible identities (i.e. the first q elements of Z p ). For sake of contradiction suppose there exists an adversary A that has non-negligible advantage (k) into breaking the pseudorandom decapsulation of SK IB-KEM. Then we are able to build a simulator B which is able to break the DBDHI assumption with non-negligible advantage (k)/q.
B receives in input a tuple (g, g
× G T and must output 0 if it believes that Z = e(g, g)
1/x , or 1 otherwise. B chooses ID 0 = 0 ∈ Z p and tries to guess the challenge identity by picking a random ID k
We observe that C 0 is a valid ciphertext under identity ID 0 and randomness t/s.Then B gives mpk = (g , h ) and C 0 to the adversary.
When A asks for the private key of an identity ID j , if ID j = ID k the simulator fails and outputs a random bit b . Otherwise it is able to compute the secret key in the following way. First it defines the polynomial f j (z) = 
and gives it to the adversary. A receivesK and outputs its guess b . B outputs the same b as its guess for Z. If Z = e(g, g) 1/x then B obtains a session key of the correct form:K = e(g , g ) t s+ID . Otherwise if Z is a random element of G T , then alsoK will be random.
In conclusion, if we consider the cases in which the simulator fails, its advantage in this experiment is (k)/q.
Similarity with the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF Now we show that the DodisYampolskiy VRF [13] (that we briefly recall in appendix C) can be seen as a special instantiation of the construction given above. Indeed, theorem 3 leads to the following VRF.
Gen(1 k ) Runs G(1 k ) to obtain the description of the groups G, G T and of a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . The description of G contains a generator g ∈ G. Then the algorithm picks random s, t
e(g, g) (st)/(s+x) as the VRF output and π vsk (x) = KeyDer(x) = g 1/(s+x) as the proof of correctness. V(vpk , x, y, π x ) To verify whether y was computed correctly, one starts by running the Encap algorithm on input (vpk , x). Encap chooses ω $ ← Z p and then computes K ← e(g, g)
ω and C = (hg x ) ω . Then one checks that
Thus by setting t = s −1 mod p and ω = 1, the construction above can be optimized to get exactly the Dodis Yampolskiy VRF.
The new construction
In this section we propose a new construction of VRF suitable IB-KEM from the (conjectured) computational intractability of the decisional weak -Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem (see below for a formal description). The new scheme is inspired from Lysyanskaya [20] VRF in that the validity of each new auxiliary information aux ID (required to compute the session key) is verified by exploiting the DDH-CDH separation in bilinear groups. The new scheme however is more efficient as it leads to a VRF directly (i.e. rather than having to construct a unique signature scheme first) and does not require error correcting codes.
Decisional weak -Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Problem [4]
The decisional -wBDHI * problem in G is defined as follows. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p and g a generator of G. Given g b , g c , g b 2 , ..., g b , we say that an algorithm A has advantage in solving decisional -wBDHI
where the probability is over the random choices of b, c, z ∈ Z * p
We say that the decisional -wBDHI * assumption holds in G if no polynomially bounded adversary has advantage better than negligible in solving the decisional -wBDHI * problem in G.
Remark 4. Cheon showed in [9] an attack against the Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption and its related problems (among which the DBDHI used to prove the security of the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF). This attack reduces the security of a factor √ q and applies to the -wBDHI * as well. However, as it is stated at the beginning of this section, in our construction it is enough to assume that the -wBDHI * assumption holds only for rather small values of (i.e. = 160 or = 256). Thus in our case the security loss is not significant as in DodisYampolskiy's.
The proposed scheme follows
to obtain the description of the groups G, G T and of a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . The description of G contains a generator g ∈ G. Let {0, 1} be the space of valid identities. Then the algorithm picks (at random) a, α 1 , β 1 , . . . , α , β $ ← Z p , sets g 1 = g a , and for i = 1, . . . , sets g 0i = g βi and g 1i = g αi . The public parameters are
The master secret key is msk = (a, {α i , β i } i=1,.., ) KeyDer(msk , ID) We assume ID = ID 1 · · · ID where each ID i ∈ {0, 1}. The key derivation algorithm constructs the secret key sk ID and the auxiliary information aux ID as follows. Let h 0 = g, for i = 1 to one computes
and sets aux ID = (h 1 , . . . , h ) and sk ID = h a Encap(mpk , ID, aux ID ) Let aux ID = (h 1 , . . . , h ) computed as above, the encapsulation algorithm picks a random t $ ← Z p and computes a random session key K = e(g 1 , h ) t and a corresponding ciphertext C = g t . Decap(C , sk ID , aux ID ) the decapsulation algorithm uses the secret key sk ID and the auxiliary information aux ID to compute a session key K from a ciphertext C . This is done as follows. First, in order to guarantee the unique decryption property, a check on the validity of the auxiliary information has to be performed. This is done as follows, let h 0 = g, for i = 1, . . . ,
else check e(g, h i )
If any of the above checks fails output reject. Second, the key K is computed as K = e(C, sk ID ) = e(g 1 , h ) t Notice that, the validity of sk ID can be verified by first encrypting some random message m with respect to the public key (g, g 1 , h ) and then by checking if one can decrypt it correctly using sk ID . Now we prove the following result Theorem 4. Suppose the decisional -wBDHI * assumption holds in G, then the scheme given above is a secure VRF suitable IB-KEM scheme.
Proof. Let ID = {0, 1} the identity space. First notice that the scheme fits the syntax of VRF suitable IB-KEMs. We prove the theorem by showing that the scheme has the unique decapsulation property and meets the pseudorandom decapsulation requirement.
Unique Decapsulation We prove this by showing that for a given identity ID the corresponding h is uniquely determined as
The proof is by induction on i. First notice that it must be the case h 1 = g
, as otherwise the check e(g, h 1 )
, g) would fail. Now assume that the statement holds true for any index j − 1 < , i.e. that h j−1 = g
. We prove that the same holds for j.
Pseudorandom Decapsulation Assume that there is an an adversary A that breaks the pseudorandom decapsulation of the proposed scheme with advantage , we show how to build an adversary B that solves the decisional -wBDHI * problem with advantage /2 and runs in time comparable to that needed by A. B starts by receiving, from some challenging oracle, the values (
. . . B = g b and a value T that can be either of the form e(g, g)
or of the form e(g, g) z , for random z ∈ Z * p , depending on some random (and hidden) bit d that B is supposed to guess. First, notice that in the proposed scheme the ciphertext C is independent of specific identities, thus B can produce it without having to commit to any ID 0 . B chooses ID at random as its guess for the challenge identity. Then it sets g 1 = B a 1 , for random a ∈ Z * p , chooses at random α i , β i $ ← Z * p , for i = 1, . . . , , and computes for i = 1, . . . ,
Notice that the public parameters mpk = g, g 1 , {g ij } i=0,1;j=1.. are distributed exactly as those produced by the setup algorithm. The master secret key is implicitly set to msk = (ab, {α i b
IDi , β i b 1−IDi } i=1,.., ). Next, B computes C * as follows C * ← C = g c . Thus, C * is also correctly distributed. Now B runs A on input (mpk , C * , ID 0 ), for some randomly chosen identity ID 0 . Notice that, from the received inputs, A gets no information at all about the ID chosen by B, thus such a choice will be identical to the challenge identity with probability 1/2 . Now we show how B can answer key derivation queries for identities ID = ID. Since ID = ID there exists (at least) an index j such that ID j = ID j . For such index we have that either g 0j = g βj (if ID j = 0) or g 1j = g αj (otherwise). This means that the h corresponding to identity ID will contain the (unknown) b with exponent − 1, at most. Let n < denote the number of positions i such that ID i = ID i . B computes the h i as follows. , h is computed as B ωID n . The sk ID is set to B aωID n+1 . Recall that, since n < , B can do this operation using the values received by the challenger. It is easy to check that both the aux ID = (h 1 , . . . , h ) and sk ID are distributed as in the real key derivation algorithm.
Once A is done with its first phase of key derivation queries it outputs a challenge identity ID * . If ID * = ID, B outputs a random bit and aborts. Otherwise it constructs K ID as T aω ID , where
and aux ID is computed as before. This time however h is set to B ω ID , thus B will not be able to explicitly compute sk ID . However this is not a problem as B is not required to do so. If on the other hand T is a random value so is K ID . Thus, by standard calculations one gets that, if A has advantage in breaking the pseudorandom decapsulation property of the scheme, B breaks the decisional -wBDHI * with advantage /2 .
Remark 5. It is interesting to note that if one is interested only into a selective-VRF, then the above construction leads directly to a scheme with large input space. This does not hold for the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF because in its security proof the simulator has to guess all the queries that the adversary is going to ask even in the weaker selective case.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a new methodology to construct verifiable random functions (VRF) from a class of identity based key encapsulation schemes that we call VRF suitable. We showed the applicability of our methods by providing two concrete realizations of the new primitive. The first one leads to a VRF that is very similar to the Dodis-Yampolskiy construction, while the second leads to a new construction. A natural question left open by this research is to find new (potentially better) instantiations of the primitive, possibly ones supporting exponentially large (in the security parameter) identity spaces and provably secure under non interactive assumptions. This would solve the long standing open problem of realizing a secure VRF with unbounded input size.
